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Background: Public health care dominated the services provision in China before 1980s. However, the number of
private health care providers in China has been increasing since then. The growth of private hospitals escalated
after a market-oriented reform was implemented in 2001. Through an experimental approach, this study aims to a
better understanding of the dynamic change in preference of health care utilisation among the residents in urban
China.
Methods: Based on a discrete choice experiment (DCE) from a random sample of respondents in urban China, the
study evaluated preference over health care attributes affecting individuals’ choice for the utilisation of hospital
health care. The marginal willingness-to-pay for five health care attributes was estimated, including public/private
provision of health care, by analysing mixed logit and latent class models.
Results: The results indicated a significantly negative marginal willingness-to-pay for private health care, which
was interpreted as representing people’s previous interactions with the health care system. The latent class model
further suggested preference heterogeneity across our sample. We found that Hukou type, a typical indicator
of socioeconomic background, was significantly related to respondents’ preference for health care utilisation.
Permanent urban residents (urban Hukou) valued private health care less; in contrast rural migrants (rural Hukou)
were more likely to be indifferent between public/private provision.
Conclusion: Urban residents in China showed a high disposition to obtain health care from the public providers of
health care. Our results have implications in the context of the Chinese government attempts to expand the private
health care sector in the short term. Policy makers need to consider residents’ preference for health care in health
policy development as the preference can only change in the long term.
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The health care system in China has been dominated by
hospital institutions, especially the public hospitals.
Hospitals, particularly public hospitals, provide ninety
percent of the country’s inpatient and outpatient health
care services [1]. However, as a part of the consequence
of public financial stagnation and decline beginning in* Correspondence: ctang@swufe.edu.cn
1School of Public Administration, Southwestern University of Finance and
Economics, Chengdu, Sichuan 610072, China
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© 2016 The Author(s). Open Access This artic
International License (http://creativecommons
reproduction in any medium, provided you g
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zethe early 1990s, public health care systems in China have
suffered from severe revenue shortfalls during a time
when the population is getting older and richer. Inevitably,
quality has deteriorated in public hospitals.
Faced with a rise in the demand for health care and a
long waiting-list in public hospitals, the government has
applied a series of market-oriented policies to endorse
the development of a private hospital sector since 2000,
which has resulted in a rapid increase in the number of
private hospitals in China [2, 3]. More and more people
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income [4]. However, there is still limited information
on the demand side in the literature, specifically how
individuals choose health care services, and whether or
not they consider the characteristics of the providers in
their choice.
Most of the published literature investigating the
demand for private health care providers among the
range of provider choices is from high-income settings,
although we are aware of some studies completed in
middle-or-low-income countries [5–7]. In general,
patients in the US prefer non-profit and private health
care providers, whereas the UK’s patients prefer public
hospitals over private ones [8–10]. As we know, how-
ever, health care systems in developed countries are
significantly different from those in developing coun-
tries. For example, the private hospital sector in China is
substantially underdeveloped in contrast to it in devel-
oped countries [1].
The existing literature on the demand for health care
in China is scarce and limited, with the focus being on
the overall utilisation level or probability [4, 11]. Previ-
ous studies rarely control for the biases related to vari-
ous types of illnesses [12, 13]. Moreover, the majority of
studies find significant preferences for contextual factors
(e.g. social and demographic characteristics), the per-
ceived need for care (e.g. perceived characteristics of
perceived illness), and enabling factors (e.g. access to
health care) [14–16]. The public/private feature of health
care has been examined in one study, in which the
chance to work in the private health sector is valued by
doctors, however the impacts of public/private attribute
on patients are still unknown in current literature [17].
Although there is a wealth of literature on determi-
nants of provider choice for health treatments, most
studies analyse the health care seeking decision ex post.
Studies typically make use of observational data or
revealed-preference data and analyse which patients’
characteristics may explain heterogeneity in health care
utilisation [4, 18]. To the best of our knowledge, only a
few of the studies have used discrete choice experiments
(DCE) in research on health care demand in developing
countries. For example, Hanson and his colleagues
explored the preferences for hospital quality in Zambia
with the results from DCE, yet the attribute of hospital
type was not considered [19].
With this paper, we try to contribute to a better under-
standing of the health care utilisation in developing
countries. Specifically, we investigated whether Chinese
urban residents prefer the public sector’s health care
provision in a developing country with rapid growth of
private health sector. Our study first takes advantages of
a discrete choice experiment to evaluate the attributes of
health care, including public/private provision of healthcare, based on a random sample of respondents in urban
China. We apply conditional logit, mixed logit and latent
class models to analyse preference heterogeneity for
specific attributes of health care. Our results demon-
strate that there is significant heterogeneity in the
valuation of the attributes, and this heterogeneity is sig-
nificantly correlated with Hukou type, a typical indicator
of socioeconomic background in China [20, 21].
We further estimate the marginal willingness-to-pay
(MWTP) for five health care attributes: knowing the
doctor, the hospital type, the travel time, the waiting
time, and the number of visits via the latent class ran-
dom utility model. The analysis indicates that respon-
dents are willing to pay a higher value for public
providers of health care than the private one, which can
be interpreted as representing their past experiences
with the health care system. This finding is consistent
with a previous study [22], which qualitatively reported
rural-to-urban migrants in China commonly using
private health care both before and after migration. The
results of the stated preference experiments that focus
on provider traits are highly complementary to insights
from previous studies that focus on patients’ characteris-
tics. Our finding has substantial policy implications in
the contexts that China’s government made an ambitious
initiative to attract private capital into health care indus-
try before 2017 [23, 24]. We suggest that it is important
to take into account the public preferences on the public
before any decision to expand the private sector.
Methods
Discrete choice experiment is one of the popular stated
preference methods in health economics [25–27], which
can be used to address a number of policy-related ques-
tions [28]. Adopting random utility theory, consumer
theory and experimental design theory, the DCE method
defines a hypothetical good or alternative (for example,
health care service in this case) in terms of various attri-
butes, in which individuals’ valuation will depend upon
the different levels (or values) of these attributes [29]. A
discrete choice experiment can be described by the
following stages: (1) selection of attributes and levels,
(2) experimental design and construction of choice
sets, (3) survey implementation [26].
Attributes and levels selection
Qualitative methods are suggested to develop the
attributes and levels used in the DCE [30]. In this study,
we first identified the conceptual framework based on
previous studies that explored health care utilisations
[4, 19, 31, 32]. To further refine the conceptual dimen-
sions and develop general wording in DCE, we con-
ducted two mini focus group discussions (less than 6
participants for each) among health care policy-makers and
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discussions were conducted by a moderator, audio re-
corded, transcribed and analysed in constant compari-
son approach. After exclusion of medicine availability
from primary conceptual framework, six attributes
from the qualitative study were included in the final
DCE. The alternatives to hospital health care in the
experimental choice design were considered to be ap-
propriately characterised by six attributes. The ration-
ale for selecting six attributes and their level are
presented below:
1. Knowing the doctor: This attribute refers to the fact
that the patient knows who their doctor is. Three
levels are specified for this attribute—the unknown,
the known, and the known well. This attribute may
reflect patients’ information on doctors and medical
knowledge [31].
2. Hospital type: The levels for hospital type are
determined by the current provision situation within
China—A-level Public Hospital (e.g. large teaching
hospital), C-level Public Hospital (e.g. small
community hospital), and Private Hospital. The
provider attribute is included in the DCE design
so that we can examine respondents’ preference
for public and private hospitals [4].
3. Distance: Distance is represented by the travel time
it takes for the respondent to visit the hospital to try
to obtain health care. Travel time is respectively 20,
40 and 60 min on a one-way bus; since the public
bus is the primary mode of transportation in
China. This is a part of time costs and also
an implicit out-of-pocket expenditure for some
respondents [32].
4. Waiting time: This attribute indicates the time that
a patient has to wait from registration until being
diagnosed by the doctors, in which a psychological
cost due to the anxiety of a health problem is
included. Waiting time is respectively 0.5, 2 and 4 h,
which is supposed to be consistent with previous
research and statistics [33].
5. Out-of-pocket cost: This is the cost shared by
the patient that represents the total charge by
the hospital, minus the insurance refunds. These
numbers are calculated using administrative health
insurance claims data from local health departments.
This is the only monetary attribute that can be used
for estimating willingness-to-pay for other attributes.
6. Number of visits: The number of visits indicates
length of the whole treatment. The more visits
required, the more severe the illness and the higher
explicit and implicit costs to a patient. The number
of visits is assumed to be 1, 2 or 3, for either of the
alternatives [32] Table 1.Experimental design
A full factorial design involves 729(3^6) possible combi-
nations for each choice alternative. We created this DCE
design using an orthogonal array (a fractional factorial
design), in which a minimum of 18 choice sets were re-
quired in order to analyse the main effects, assuming
that no significant interactions existed. The basic design
was obtained from the mix-and-match method that was
described in Louviere’s book [34], for an unlabelled
design. These 18 choice sets were further divided into
two blocks so that each respondent only needed to
answer 9 questions in the experimental part of the
questionnaire. In each scenario, respondents were asked
which hospital they would choose between “Hospital
Service 1” and “Hospital Service 2”, if they or their
family member had a bone fracture condition. Everything
about the hospitals’ health care being compared was the
same, except for the varied attributes in alternatives.
This DCE design with two unlabelled choice options,
excluding an opt-out option, was considered to be realis-
tic in the case of the Chinese health care system for
several reasons. First, an unlabelled format aims to
encourage respondents to focus on the variation of
attribute levels in each alternative, instead of the label of
the alternative [25, 35]. An unlabelled design can also be
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sets. Second, we chose two alternative designs without
an opt-out option because this appeared to reduce re-
spondents’ cognitive burden, even though a couple of
papers suggested that an unforced choice would be pre-
ferred [28, 36]. Third, we selected a bone fracture condi-
tion in the hypothetical scenario because this is a
common case for all families, and often sufficiently ser-
ious enough to visit a hospital immediately. Therefore, it
was consequently possible to obtain real preference ex-
pressions from a large sample of the adult population
Fig. 1.
Data collection and analysis
The questionnaire applied in the survey included two
parts: in the first part, respondents were asked about a
set of demographic and socioeconomic questions that
were modified from a published survey on primary
health care in the same city [37]; the second part
involved 9 DCE choice sets that were divided by the 18
minimum required choice sets so that two blocks of the
questionnaire needed to be prepared. (See Additional file 1
for the questionnaire).
Ten well-trained undergraduate students from a local
medical university conducted all of the interviews, in which
the interviewers were responsible for explaining the survey,
going through the questionnaire and collecting responses
from respondents. Training included understanding the
DCE design and questions, identifying people who were
qualified to participate, eliciting and recording the re-
sponses. The training course introduced three common
biases,1 such as information bias, non-trader bias and
strategic bias [38], in DCE data collection, and taught inter-
viewers how to prevent biases by probing and motivating
respondents to make trade-off in decision-making.
Data collection was carried out in Fuzhou of Fujian
province, where a developing private hospitals market
provides an appropriate context for this study [3]. In
order to cover both urban residents and rural-urban
migrants, we surveyed three local markets in three
different communities. The one is a downtown communityFig. 1 Sample choice setwhere the majority of residents are the urban resi-
dents; the second is a suburban community inhabited
by rural-urban migrants; the third is located at an
urban-rural fringe area which is a mixed community.
Five hundred and seven respondents who were over
18 years of age were randomly recruited at the mar-
ket after receiving their informed consent. The sample
size was based on the most commonly cited rule-of-
thumb proposed by Orme, who gave an equation2 to
determine a minimum sample size required for DCE
involving the main estimation effects only [39].
We started by estimating a conditional logit model
(CL) that was based on the random utility theory [40].
In addition to the conditional logit model, we further
carried out both a mixed logit model (MXL, or random
parameters logit model) and a latent class model (LCM,
or finite mixture analysis) as approaches to account for
heterogeneity in the preferences among respondents.3
Calculating marginal willingness-to-pay (MWTP) or
implicit prices that follow the standard utility difference
expression is a more convenient way to interpret coeffi-
cients in a mixed logit model and latent class model
[41]. MWTP represents the marginal utility associated
with a change in a health care attribute in monetary
units, which can indicate how much an individual would
be willing to pay to take or avoid a particular change in
a given health care attribute.
Results
Description
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of our sample of
507 respondents. The average age of respondents was 32
in our sample, which is younger than the estimated
average age (34) for urban and rural residents in local areas
according to the Six Nationwide Population Census in
China [42]. The percentage of male respondents accounted
for 58.78 % of participants, while the average ratio of males
in the local region is 51.45 %. About 47.73 % of respon-
dents registered as urban households, while the percentage
of those who registered in rural areas is 57.09 %. The
distribution of education level is skewed to the right,
Table 2 Descriptive information for respondents
Block 1 % Block 2 % Total %
Age 30.98 (12.19) 33.23 (14.33) 32.11 (13.34)
Gender
Male 146 57.71 152 59.84 298 58.78
Female 107 42.29 102 40.16 209 41.22
Household registration
Urban registration 120 47.43 122 48.03 242 47.73
Rural registration 133 52.57 132 51.97 265 52.27
Education
Junior middle school or below 49 19.37 67 26.38 116 22.88
High school 41 16.21 47 18.50 88 17.36
Vocational Diploma 62 24.51 61 24.02 123 24.26
University 101 39.92 79 31.10 180 35.50
Monthly income
< 1001 RMB ($162) 72 28.46 75 29.53 147 28.99
1001–3000 RMB ($162–$487) 70 27.67 76 29.92 146 28.80
3001–5000 RMB ($487–$812) 73 28.85 66 25.98 139 27.42
> 5000 RMB (>$812) 38 15.02 37 14.57 75 14.79
Employment
Employed full-time 151 59.68 133 52.36 284 56.02
Employed part-time 12 4.74 19 7.48 31 6.11
Not employed 1 0.40 6 2.36 7 1.38
Retired or Student 68 26.88 67 26.38 135 26.63
Other (Specify) 21 8.30 29 11.42 50 9.86
Total 254 100.00 253 100.00 507 100.00
Conversion rate is USD1.00 = RMB 6.16, www.oanda.com, June 23, 2014
mean coefficients; sd in parentheses
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mean monthly income of respondents participating in our
survey was about 3014 CNY, compared to the average
monthly per capita income of 3258 CNY in 2014. The in-
come is reasonable if we take rural-urban migrants in our
sample into account. Of 507 valid responses, 56 % of the
surveyed individuals were working in full-time jobs; 28.8
% were retired or students; around 10 % of participants
were not specified. Our sample mainly covers the original
urban residents and rural-urban migrants, so it is reason-
able to find out more male and educated respondents in
our sample than general population [43]. To guaran-
tee the representativeness of our data, we must em-
ploy a random sampling method to collect our data.
As an interviewer-administered survey, the sample
can only be broadly representative of the urban popu-
lation in the city.
Estimation results
Table 3 illustrates the regression results for conditional
logit model and mixed logit model. A total of 4563choice sets were included in the estimation (507 respon-
dents, 9 choice sets each). In general, all coefficient esti-
mates were consistent across the conditional logit and
mixed logit models. The signs of parameters can be
compared, however, the magnitude of coefficient esti-
mates were not able to be compared.
The first column shows the health care attribute, and
the other columns present coefficients4 and standard
errors in parentheses. Comparing with a large public
hospital (the baseline level), an alternative with the small
public hospital (−0.465) decreases the likelihood of
choosing an option, as does even worse for the private
hospital (−0.990). This result suggests that patients in
China prefer large and public hospitals over private
hospitals and small-public hospitals. As expected, the
higher the waiting time in hospital (−0.998 for 4 h), the
less likely a patient was to choose that particular alterna-
tive, but it appears that a short waiting time, like 2 h,
revealed no difference compared to the baseline level—the
half hour. However, the coefficients for the attribute of
knowing the doctor were not significant, since we
Table 3 Estimated results for attributes levels in DCE
Conditional Logit Mixed Logit
Mean Coefficients Mean Coefficients SD
Small public −0.465*** −0.509*** 0.184
(0.0622) (0.0735) (0.300)
Private −0.990*** −1.257*** 0.866***
(0.0893) (0.110) (0.125)
hrs2 −0.247 −0.237 0.499
(0.139) (0.324) (1.042)
hrs4 −0.998*** −1.339*** −0.998***
(0.120) (0.183) (0.280)
Known −0.0529 −0.0358 −0.0128
(0.0531) (0.0664) (0.111)
Acquainted 0.0381 0.0582 0.556***
(0.0756) (0.0863) (0.104)
min40 −0.606*** −0.706*** −0.0536
(0.0675) (0.0797) (0.133)
min60 −1.053*** −1.277*** −0.174
(0.0971) (0.113) (0.212)
Two −0.287*** −0.376*** 0.0195
(0.0753) (0.0912) (0.137)











Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.001
Table 4 Selection criteria of latent classes
Classes LLF Nparam AIC CAIC BIC
2 −2520.981 30 5101.962 5258.4 5228.4
3 −2477.178 48 5050.356 5300.658 5252.658
4 −2445.957 66 5023.914 5368.078 5302.078
5 −2423.697 84 5015.393 5453.421 5369.421
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crease the possibility to select that option.
In the MXL model, we assigned a normal distribution
to five health care attribute parameters, and the variable
out-of-pocket cost was specified as non-random. Thus,
the preferences for the price of the health care were
assumed to be homogeneous, that is, the marginal
utility of price was assumed to be constant over the
sample in order to calculate MWTP. Additionally, the
large and significant standard deviation estimates in
the MXL model indicate the presence of considerable
preference heterogeneity, which suggests the applica-
tion of a latent class model. For example, comparing
the mean effect of − 1.257 for the private hospital tolarge public hospital to a standard deviation of 0.866
tell this relationship.
In Table 4, we identified the optimal number of classes
in LCM by assessing the Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC), the Consistent Akaike Information Criterion
(CAIC) and the log likelihood statistics of the models
with 2–5 classes [44]. Both BIC and CAIC implied that
their minimum value were at the 2-class model, which
suggested the unnecessary to search for higher classes
[27]. Meanwhile, we used the Akaike likelihood ratio test
to compare the MXL and LC models [45]. We followed
examples of other choice experiment papers to compare
both conditional logit models with the MXL and LC
models using a likelihood ratio test [46, 47]. Overall, LC
was recommended as the preferred model in this ana-
lysis, as accounted for both observed and unobserved
heterogeneity in comparison with both the conditional
logit model and MNL model.
As can be seen from the upper section of Table 5, the
two preference classes have a clear interpretation: Class
1 was more likely to select a private hospital compared
to large public hospitals, while Class 2 was more likely
to choose large public hospitals. We labelled our classes
accordingly, as non-public-oriented and public-oriented.
Class 1 had an average membership probability of 21.1
%, and Class 2 of nearly 78.9 %. The two classes reflected
the opposite attitudes vis-à-vis the relative importance of
attributes. The members of non-public-oriented class
did not discriminate against private hospitals when they
made a choice on health care; on the contrary, the mem-
bers of the public-oriented class obtained higher utility
when the large public hospital was included as one of
dimensions in the attribute. In despite of hospital type,
all other coefficients for DCE attributes were consistent
across two classes. While we look at the coefficients of
variables that determined the membership of classes, we
found only “Hukou”, among all socio-economic variables
included in the estimation, had an impact on choice.
Respondents from rural households, ceteris paribus, are
more likely than those from urban households to be
non-public-oriented members.
Marginal willingness to pay
The comparison of coefficients among three models is
not available, as models are parameterised in different
Table 5 Estimated results for attributes levels in DCE (Latent
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willingness-to-pay can be calculated for each of the attri-
butes for three reported models. In Table 6, we report
the mean marginal WTP for each attribute for the CL,
MXL and LC models. The mean estimates of attributes
differ slightly across the three models, especially for the
first two models, the conditional logit model and the
mixed logit model. We focused on the WTP in LCM. We
found that the weighted average marginal WTP of seg-
ments for increasing waiting time, distance, and visits
were RMB − 62.17,−522.05,−389.32,−621.63,−112.07, and
− 236.93, respectively; where the negative sign for waiting
time, distance, and visits reflected that respondents on
average are willing to pay in order to improve the accessi-
bility to health care. However, the mean WTP for hospital
type between two classes was totally opposite, which
proved that individuals in two segments have different
tastes when choosing public and private hospitals.
Validity of DCE
There are two important assumptions for the validity of
Discrete Choice Experiments. The first is whether the
respondents can understand the structure of the DCE,
and thus make rational decisions in choice sets. The
other is the appearance of dominant preference for one
or a couple of specific attributes in which a lack of
trade-off between attributes would result in the unavail-
ability of the indifference curve and marginal rate of
substitution. A consistency test is conventionally con-
ducted to deal with the first problem, yet we did not
perform it by including a choice set in which one
alternative is obviously preferred to the other. As in our
DCE, the face-to-face interview by an experienced
surveyor and a small number of questions (only 9
questions) for each respondent largely mitigated the
necessity for a consistency test. We performed the
Dominance preferences test in which a pseudo t-test is
examined by comparing a specific attribute parameter
estimated in the full model including all variables with the
same attribute parameter estimated in the reduced model
including only this attribute [48]. It is the indication of
dominant preference for this attribute if the null hypoth-
esis for the two parameters (βi = βj) cannot be rejected.
Our tests did not support the argument that a dominant
attribute existed in this DCE.
Discussion
This study identified a range of attributes that influence
preference for health care utilisation that are relatively
familiar to respondents, including knowing the doctor,
hospital type, distance from the hospital to the resi-
dence, waiting time in the hospital, out-of-pocket cost
and the number of visits during the whole treatment
period. In the design of our experiment, we chose
Table 6 Marginal willingness-to-pay for each attribute across models (RMB)
CL MXL Latent class model
Segment 1 Segment 2 Weighted average of segments
Small public −246.23 −209.49 81.84 −359.55 −266.42
Private −524.90 −517.09 106.50 −761.11 −578.04
hrs2 −130.74 −97.53 146.59 −117.99 −62.17
hrs4 −529.06 −550.61 −444.43 −542.81 −522.05
Known −28.02 −14.71 171.72 −42.96 2.34
Acquainted 20.21 23.94 149.27 40.04 63.09
min40 −320.90 −290.33 −234.58 −430.70 −389.32
min60 −558.23 −525.31 −343.00 −696.14 −621.63
Two −151.86 −154.66 −281.12 −66.87 −112.07
Three −275.97 −281.05 −650.67 −126.29 −236.93
The numbers in italic refers to insignificant estimates; otherwise the parameters are significantly different from zero at a 1% level of confidence
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cost and quality dimensions of the health care through
the focus group discussions. The purpose was to minim-
ise the unmeasured preference variation between the
alternatives, and also to some extent avoid the dominant
preference as the DCE study assumes independent attri-
butes to investigate the main effects by estimation.
Our results show that public/private provision of
health care is an important attribute taken into account
when individuals are searching for health care in China.
We further suggest that this particular attribute can be
interpreted as reflecting respondents’ previous experi-
ences with the health care system in China. Past interac-
tions with the health care system have been considered
as an influential factor in health care utilisation in the
literature [49]. One important result in our study is that
respondents generally prefer public health care. Add-
itionally, the other three identified attributes—distance
from hospital to residence, waiting time in hospital, and
the number of visits during the whole treatment
period—are in the spirit of the most theoretical
models of the health care utilisation. As the majority
of Chinese residents, no matter in rural or urban
area, are covered by one of three public health insur-
ances at present, the out-of-pocket cost is included in
order to highlight the real cost for a specific illness.
Previous papers in Gambia and UK also considered
drug availability, examination, parking facilities, and
complications from treatment which did not seem to
be feasible factors in our context [50, 51].
On the other hand, this study examined the impact of
preference heterogeneity on the estimates. The LCM
captures the variation in preferences for specific attri-
butes, and thus helped us to identify public-oriented and
non-public-oriented classes. The first class, labelled
public-oriented respondents comprised 79 % of the
sampled individuals. They value more public health carethan private health care, and they are basically urban
Hukou. In contrast, our analysis identified nearly 21 % of
sampled respondents as non-public-oriented individuals,
who derive similar utility from either public or private
health care. Respondents in this class more likely have
rural Hukou. Our results are basically consistent with
Goodburn’s qualitative findings, in which she found rural-
to-urban migrants in China commonly use private health
care both before and after they move to an urban area [22].
Why is utility for private hospitals lower? Why don’t
residents with rural Hukou discriminate against private
hospitals? It is reasonable in a sense, but beyond expect-
ation that notorious Hukou or the household permanent
residence registration system in China works in shaping
residents preference for health care access. We provide
two explanations: one possible explanation for this result
is that private health care in China is cheap and often
with lower quality, Tang showed that fees in private hos-
pitals are lower for a specific illness when other condi-
tions are the same [52]. Second, the Hukou determines
health insurance rights and thus, the access to health
care. There are sharp restrictions on changing from a
rural to non-rural Hukou. Nowadays, people from rural
areas can now move to urban areas in order to work
with temporary mobility permits. However, as these
migrants still hold a rural Hukou, they do not have
access to the urban health insurance that to a degree is
related to the hospital health care in urban areas. So our
results show the Hukou limitation does have an impact
on health care access among urban residents in China.
This study has substantial policy implications in the
contexts that China’s government attempts to increase
market share for private hospitals from 10 % to 20 %
before 2017 [23, 24]. In terms of marginal willingness-
to-pay, the estimates suggest that the option of being
able to choose their care in a public hospital would be
valued at a price of over RMB 500, all else being equal.
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might be reflecting a more general support for the public
health system as a whole. One important implication is
that it is often rather difficult to change the provider
preference among urban residents than health policy
makers may think. As mentioned above, public provision
of health care in China has a long and robust history.
Additionally, two potential consequences may be
raised regarding the policy target, the one is private in-
vestors are not willing to invest enough capital given
limited demands for the private health care. The other is
that the rapid expansion of the private investment fails
to provide appropriate services, which further damage
the private’s reputation and makes it harder to change
residents’ taste for the private health care. Another pol-
icy implication is that it is unacceptable politically to
sustain a rural-urban separated health care system that
brings up urban residents with higher taste for health
care. It is better to design policy incentives in order to
influence residents’ preference about public-private
dimension of health care providers. We thus provide a
clear example of where understanding preferences is
important for effective health care policy making.
There are a few of limitations we must be open to ac-
knowledge in this study. In the case of experimental
design, there were a number of constraints including the
lack of use of the status quo option, and the lack of prior
information for use in generating the experimental
design. To elicit preference with more confidence, a con-
sistent test or some more comprehensive techniques,
such as best-worst choice, should be included in the
questionnaire in future studies. In addition, our sampling
strategy, like any interviewer-administered survey, may
also suffer from selection bias. Even though the sample
was broadly representative of the population in local
urban areas, the sample of 507 respondents for this data
was slightly more educated than the general population,
and had additional males than the general population.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this paper first applied a discrete choice
experiment to value the attributes of health care, includ-
ing public/private provision of health care, in the context
of growing private hospitals in China. The respondents
in urban China showed a high disposition to obtain
health care from the public providers of health care,
which may reflects their previous interactions with the
health care system. We also found an evidence of prefer-
ence heterogeneity that is correlated with respondents’
typical socioeconomic background in China. Specifically,
permanent urban residents (urban Hukou) value private
health care less; in contrast, rural migrants (rural
Hukou) are more likely to be indifferent between public/
private provision. Our results have implications in thecontext of the Chinese government attempts to expand
the private health care sector in the short term. Policy
makers need to consider residents’ preference for health
care in health policy development as the preference can
only change in the long term.
Endnotes
1Information bias refers to respondents may not be
aware of all alternatives in a choice set, or may make
associations with other alternatives that are not in-
cluded. Non-trader bias refers to respondents did not
make trade-off between the values of alternatives. Stra-
tegic bias refers to respondents uses a heuristic way in
choice decisions in which they did not compare all pre-
sented alternatives in a choice set simultaneously.
2(nta)/c > =500, where n is the number of respondents,
t is the number of tasks, a is number of alternatives per
task (not including the none alternative), and c is equal
to the largest number of levels for any one attribute.
3CL model allows full covariance among alternatives
using a joint normal distribution, in which it assumes
that respondents have the same preferences (or that
their preferences depend on observable characteristics).
MXL model overcomes these limitations by allowing the
coefficients in the model to vary across decision makers.
Alternatively, the coefficients may be discrete, which
leads to the LCM.
4We interpret coefficients as the impact of the attri-
bute’s difference between alternative 1 and alternative 2
on the probability of choosing one over the other. The
positive (negative) sign of coefficients reflects whether
the attribute level increased (decreased) the likelihood of
the alternative to be chosen.
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